Iran Protests Reveal a Broken US Foreign Policy

A Cycle of Unrest and Misunderstanding

Iran is once again gripped by widespread protests. For the last month, citizens have filled the streets demanding fundamental change, triggered initially by soaring inflation but quickly escalating into calls for an end to the Islamic regime.

As speculation mounts, the outcome remains uncertain. Popular uprisings are inherently unpredictable. Yet, to many observers, this wave of protest feels different from those in 2009, 2017, 2019, and 2022. Whether it truly is different or simply appears so because Western policymakers have misunderstood the Islamic Republic for decades is the critical question.

With so much at stake, now is the perfect time to reexamine the flawed assumptions that have guided Washington's—and the West's—failed approach to Iran. Even if the current regime survives, the country will not be the same as it was before the protests began on December 28, 2025. This analysis aims to learn from past mistakes without assigning blame, providing a necessary update for a foreign policy community facing a changing Iran.

The Faulty Blueprint: America's Core Beliefs About Iran

For three decades, U.S. policy toward Iran was built on a set of core assumptions that recent events have proven to be fundamentally flawed. These beliefs shaped everything from diplomatic outreach to nuclear negotiations.

The central pillar of this thinking was that the Iranian regime is ultimately pragmatic. Its revolutionary rhetoric was seen as a public front for a realistic and practical leadership. This led to several key conclusions:

• Susceptibility to Incentives: It was believed that Iran's leaders could be influenced by American and Western diplomacy and financial offers.

• Desire for Integration: The supreme leader and his advisors were thought to prioritize integration into the international community over repressing their population and dominating the region.

• Dismissal of the Opposition: Supporting the Iranian opposition was framed as self-defeating and counter to U.S. interests, partly because the opposition was seen as too divided to be a viable alternative.

These ideas formed the foundation for President Bill Clinton's "dual containment" strategy, the nuclear negotiations under President George W. Bush, the Obama administration's Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and even Vice President J.D. Vance's "America First" approach.

How Washington Built Its Iran Echo Chamber

These persistent misconceptions didn't appear out of thin air. They were cultivated and reinforced within Washington's foreign policy ecosystem, shaped by who holds power, who they listen to, and how they view the world.

The Influence of Insiders

Certain Iranian expatriates have consistently had the ear of senior U.S. officials, giving them a platform in the media and in government simulations. These war games often portray Tehran's decision-making as supremely pragmatic in ways that clash with real-world events. Nonetheless, this is the perspective frequently presented to military officers and intelligence analysts.

While other Iranian expats hold far more critical views of the regime, they are rarely given a seat at the table. This selective access reinforces the dominant narrative that the supreme leader is open to accommodation with the United States.

The Lingering Shadow of Iraq

The 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq left a deep scar on Washington. Haunted by the high costs of regime change in Iraq, the foreign policy community adopted the view that a similar outcome in Iran must be avoided at all costs.

This aversion wasn't just a strategic preference; it evolved into a rationale for why regime change was unnecessary in the first place. This narrative conveniently relied on the same flawed assumptions: that the Iranian leadership was pragmatic and willing to strike a deal with Washington.

The JCPOA and the Partisan Divide

President Barack Obama was not the first U.S. leader to extend an olive branch to Tehran. President George H.W. Bush signaled a desire for better relations, and President Clinton sought reconciliation after Mohammad Khatami’s election in 1997. Even President George W. Bush, famous for his "axis of evil" speech, supported European diplomatic overtures and multilateral nuclear talks with Iran late in his presidency.

Obama’s outreach, however, went further and culminated in the JCPOA. Despite official denials, the deal was widely seen by his administration as a pathway to a new relationship with the Islamic Republic. There was little evidence the Iranian leadership shared this goal, but the White House set the agenda.

Support for the JCPOA became widespread within the foreign policy community, partly due to a social network effect in the Beltway. To remain in good standing, many analysts and former officials praised the deal, regardless of its shortcomings. Ben Rhodes, Obama's deputy national security advisor, claimed the Washington establishment was united against the JCPOA, but the reality was the opposite; while critics were vocal, a far larger contingent was in favor.

This dynamic contributed to the political polarization of Middle East policy. Countries that opposed the deal—namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Israel—became identified with the Republican Party. Their security concerns, highlighted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's 2015 address to Congress, were often dismissed by Democrats as bad-faith arguments rather than genuine strategic assessments. In retrospect, their skepticism about the nature of the Iranian regime appears to have been more accurate than Washington's.

A Time for Clarity on Iran

The debate over President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA may never be resolved, but it is clear that America’s regional partners had a better grasp of the Iranian regime than many in Washington. It is long past time to reframe our understanding.

A new approach must recognize the direct link between the clerical system's domestic repression and its aggressive foreign policy. These are not separate issues; they are core components of the Islamic Republic's identity. U.S. diplomacy and goodwill cannot change the fundamental nature of the regime.

Once this is understood, it becomes obvious that the current negotiations offered by Iran's foreign minister are a ruse—a lifeline for a regime that has lost its credibility and legitimacy. Engaging in these talks not only harms U.S. interests but also undermines the Iranian protestors fighting for change.

For decades, U.S. policy on Iran has failed because its assumptions have been detached from reality. The ongoing uprisings offer a golden opportunity to finally see the regime as it is, not as the United States wishes it to be.